In 1929, a border dispute between Jordan and Saudi Arabia led to clashes, with the British backing Jordan. When Standard Oil heard about this, their agents got in touch with Ibn Saud, reached an understanding, and proceeded to bankroll him with gold coins and rifles. This led to increased American-Saudi contacts. In 1932, the Kingdom was founded. In 1936, oil was discovered by an American oil company within the Rockefeller orbit. In 1945, US President FDR met with King Ibn Saud, and finalized an understanding between their nations-Saudi oil for US security.

The October 1973 War & the Birth of the Petro-Dollar

The October 1973 Israeli-Arab war (completely scripted and managed by Rockefeller man Kissinger)-laid the groundwork for an increase in oil prices.

Some Background

In 2010, the Rockefeller Empire did a side deal with Iran. The US will re-establish diplomatic ties with Iran and remove sanctions on the country if Iran were to send troops to the Golan Heights to stop Israel from developing the huge new oil field discovered in the Golan Heights. Both the families were shareholders in this field, but the Rothschilds got greedy, and took the entire field.

This was a serious issue as the Americans did not wish Israel to have its own sources of oil. This would enable Israel to expand its borders and create havoc, and its actions may go counter to American designs for the region. In short, New York could not allow that.

A back-channel through Oman was established between the US and Iran. The deal was done. The Mossad found out about this, informed the Saudis. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia felt cheated by the covert negotiations between Washington and Iran.   Both Israel and Riyadh were furious. And, this brought them closer, following the principle – “my enemy’s enemy is my friend “. To read the whole story, read our article on this issue, titled “THE BREAK-UP”. The US-Iran deal lasted till end 2015, when the nationalist IRGC withdrew from the deal.This covert link would come in handy a few years later.

Enter MBS

Salman bin Abdul-Aziz was the highest profile surviving member of the so-called “Sudairi Seven.” Crucially, by the time of his succession in January 2015, Salman bin Abdul-Aziz had already served as governor of Riyadh for 48 years, as minister of defense and then as crown prince.  Moreover, as head of the royal family’s internal Majlis al-Uthra or “Descendants’ Council,” he had also gained a reputation as the “chief whip who kept the sprawling Al-Saud in line.” He was the royal enforcer who punished princes and as the disciplinarian of the royal family.  Many royals that broke the rules were locked up in his own private jail.   

 Moreover, beyond the 70-year-old Muqrin bin Abdul-Aziz, the ten other remaining sons of Ibn Saud were all even older men. There was therefore a practical need – sooner rather than later – to modernize Saudi Arabia’s succession process;  from one based on straightforward seniority (with one brother replacing another) to one in which the most capable of the “third generation princes” would be able to take over.

Unlike many other royal family members, King Salman refused to allow his youngest to be educated in the West. He was educated in Saudi Arabia, and was properly tutored by his father to be a 100% nationalist, and not become a pawn of either the 2 families.

Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud born 31 August 1985, colloquially known by his initials MBS is Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia.  MBS was born as the eldest of six children to Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz and his third wife. MBS is the eldest among his mother’s six children and is the eighth child and seventh son of his father.  His full siblings include Prince Turki and Prince Khalid. MBS holds a bachelor’s degree in Islamic law from King Saud University. After obtaining a law degree from King Saud University, he served as an advisor to his father.  On 6 April 2008 Mohammed married his first cousin Sara bint Mashour, a daughter of his paternal uncle Mashour bin Abdulaziz. Prince Mohammed and Princess Sara have five children.  After Salman ascended the throne in January 2015, he appointed MBS as minister of defense, and MBS was also given the role of deputy crown prince in April 2015. He was promoted to crown prince after the dismissal of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, King Salman’s nephew, in 2017.

The crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the de facto strongman of the neighboring UAE federation – Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (a.k.a. “MBZ”) – has clearly served as something of a role model for his younger counterpart and may at some stage have been counseling or even directly assisting him.  following MBS’s first key promotions , a  mentor-mentee relationship had developed between the two men based on shared interests, common enemies, and burgeoning opportunities., with regard to international relations, it does seem MBS was at least initially operating under MBZ’s direct tutelage.

Rise to Power

 On 15 December 2009, at the age of 24, he entered politics as a special advisor to his father when the latter was the governor of Riyadh Province. At this time MBS began to rise from one position to another, In October 2011, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz died. Prince Salman began his ascent to power by becoming second deputy prime minister and minister of defence. He made MBS his private advisor.

In June 2012, Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz died. MBS moved up into the number two position in the hierarchy, as his father became the new crown prince and first deputy prime minister. He soon began remaking the court in his own image. On 25 April 2014, MBS was appointed state minister.

On 23 January 2015, King Abdullah died and Salman ascended the throne. MBS was appointed minister of defence and secretary general of the royal court. In addition, he retained his post as the minister of state. MBS was appointed crown prince on 21 June 2017, following the King’s decision to depose Muhammad bin Nayef and make his own son the heir to the throne. 

Former Saudi crown prince Muhammad bin Nayef was arrested on 6 March 2020, along with his half-brother Nawwaf bin Nayef and King Salman’s brother Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz. The three princes were charged with treason. All three were part of a pro-American faction within the Saudi royal family that wanted MBS out.  The Saudi government claimed the princes were trying to overthrow MBS.

Among  these,  perhaps  the  most  discussed,  have  been  his  promises  of  substantial  economic reform. Indeed, the period between MBS’s April 2015 and June 2017 appointments as deputy crown prince and then crown prince was a time of great alarm and uncertainty in Saudi Arabia.  Not only had overall joblessness risen to 12%, but youth unemployment was nearly 29% with little prospect of young Saudis finding jobs outside the bloated, oil revenue-financed public sector. Meanwhile, the “shale revolution” in the US and subsequent oil price plunge from June 2014 onward, juxtaposed with Saudi Arabia’s fast-increasing (and export-limiting)  domestic  energy  demands  had led to Riyadh running a unprecedented budget deficit in 2015. It was the equivalent to more than 15% of the country’s GDP.

 In this context, the opportunity for MBS to present himself as something of a savior was undoubtedly enormous, especially given that the “old guard” appeared to have failed in steadying the ship. After all, rather than any attempt to drastically overhaul the Saudi economy, the only real response to the post-2014 situation had simply been to increase oil supply unilaterally in order to gain market share (as it had done in the mid-1980s). Riyadh was working on the assumption that a short period of extremely low prices would be enough to “crush US oil frackers” and put out of business many of their new higher-cost competitors. Responding to the perceived crisis, in April 2016, members of MBS’s team admitted to the international media that the Saudi government spending had previously gone “berserk” under King Abdullah’s reign.  “Roughly between $80 to $100 billion dollars [about a quarter of the entire budget] of inefficient spending every year” had occurred and with controls on major contracts having been effectively suspended.  they  even  claimed  the  country  could  have  gone  broke  by  early  2017  but   that  MBS  had  immediately  cut  the  budget  by  25%,  reinstating  strict  spending  controls.

  At  the  same  time,  but  more  ambitiously,  a  “Saudi  Vision  2030”  strategy  was  launched under the banner of growing and diversifying the economy. Closely mirroring the policy recommendations of a December 2014 IMF briefing note, this strategy was reportedly the culmination of MBS’s “quiet planning” for a “major restructuring of the government and economy aiming to fulfil . . . his generation’s ‘different dreams’ for a post carbon future. Saudi Vision 2030 emphasized the need for rapid economic liberalization, greater global integration, and a fundamental “de-petrolization” of the Saudi economy.

  Concurrently,  MBS’s  push  for  greater  social  liberalization  also  seems  to  have  generated considerable support, especially from younger citizens keen to see their rulers challenge anachronistic practices and weaken the roles of ultraconservative and misogynistic religious establishments. Young Saudis are thrilled that the country finally has a bold leader trying to modernize.  The youth are the ones to have benefited the most from MBS’s liberalisation . . . MBS has a big constituency there. Indeed, as a local commentator speaking to the BBC has explained, “talk to anyone aged 16–25. . .  And they see MBS as a hero . . . they love the socio-cultural changes he’s bringing, pushing back the power of the religious fundamentalists.” With regard to the reforms themselves, in Saudi Arabia there seems little doubt that  MBS  has  managed  to  go  far  further  than  any  of  his  predecessors by having quickly set up a highly educated young team . . . to transform the country.  Mohammed’s ideology has been described as nationalist and populist, with a conservative attitude towards politics, and a liberal stance on economic and social issues. It has been heavily influenced by the views of his adviser and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed.

On Iran, for example, Saudi Arabia and  the  UAE’s  joint  intervention  in  Yemen  against  the  putatively  Tehran-linked  Houthi forces  began within weeks of MBS’s January 2015 appointment as minister of defense and just days before his April 2015 promotion  to  deputy  crown  prince., just weeks before MBS’s June 2017 installation as crown prince.

In April 2015, Mohammed was given control over Saudi Aramco by royal decree following his appointment as deputy crown prince.

In December 2017, Mohammed criticized the United States’ decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In March 2018, he referred to Turkey as part of a “triangle of evil” alongside Iran and Qatar.

With regard to maintaining power, MBS appears to have relied on much tighter inner circles than those of his predecessors , in addition to forming  the  second  layer  of  his  elite  political  patronage  networks,  MBS  rapidly promoted a small number of non-royal Saudi technocrats to his team.

On 27 September 2022, MBS was appointed as prime minister of Saudi Arabia by King Salman. Traditionally, the king has held the title of prime minister. Crown Prince MBS is now widely portrayed as Saudi Arabia’s leader. MBS has travelled extensively around the world, meeting with politicians, business leaders and celebrities.

Regional Geopolitics:

The 2014 Oil Price Crash

After peaking at $107 a barrel in June, 2014, oil prices plunged to $44 by end January 2015, in a little over 7 months. What caused this? We shall explain briefly:

The fundamental reason for the decline in world petroleum prices in 2014 was an oversupply of petroleum compared to demand. World supply has risen over the past couple of years, largely spurred on by a growth in production from the United States-mainly due to fracking and shale oil. Since peaking in 2005, U.S. dependency on foreign petroleum has declined.

Another factor leading to strong global supplies is increased production coming from the Organization of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC), notably from Saudi Arabia. Several OPEC members— including Venezuela, Ecuador, and Iran—appealed for production cuts and called for special consultations to address declining prices, fearing the threat of financial strain on their economies. However, Saudi Arabia maintained that OPEC should allow the market to stabilize and ensure that the cartel protects market share against non-OPEC producers.

 Another factor related to demand is the value of the U.S. dollar. Oil on the world market is priced mostly in dollars, so the price for oil will also depend on the movements of other currencies relative to the dollar. As the relative value of the dollar increases, producers will tend to lower the price of petroleum rather than passing the entire price increase on to foreign buyers. From June 2014 to January 2015, the dollar’s value rose 14.3 percent compared to an average of currencies from major trading partners of the United States. These are the reasons given by the main stream media. Now, here are the real reasons.

In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, which brought about US sanctions on it. To punish Russia, the Rockefeller Empire instructed Saudi Arabia to drop oil prices by increasing production. But, this was done in a very cunning manner. To fool the Saudis into doing this, they told the Saudis that US shale oil production is rising. Due to its high cost of shale production, the suggestion was that a fall in oil prices would devastate the shale oil sector-due to its heavy debt loads and high cost of production.

The Saudis were fooled.

In reality, the oil price drop was intended to hurt the income of both Russia and Iran. That did it. Saudi increased oil production, and the oil price fell. The cost to the Saudis was some $200 billion.

Syria & Yemen

The US came up with a diabolical plan to make Iran and the Arabs fight: -the age-old strategy of divide-and-rule. And this was the plan hatched by the CIA.

The Arab Spring was meant to regime change governments in the region, and install Muslim Brotherhood governments. To a certain extent, this plan worked, for a while. The next part of the plan was to destabilize the oil-monarchies. This required the CIA to create tensions between Iran and the Arabs. The Syrian regime change operation kicked off in March 2011, and within 5 years, a second front was opened in Yemen. Then, these plans of the US backfired. Syria stood with the help of Iran. In mid-2015, MBS called Putin and requested Russia intervene in Syria, as Saudi did not want a Muslim Brotherhood government in Damascus. In September, this was done.

Study the map of the Persian Gulf. Almost all oil and gas shipped out of this area has to pass through the maritime “choke-point” of the Straits of Hormuz, which is not hard to block, due to its narrow width. The US plan was to choke off oil shipments from this region, in order to “blackmail” China and the EU into following its geopolitical dictates. When both the Gulf Arabs and the Saudis realized the American game-plan to block the Straits of Hormuz (which would cripple oil export revenues from all the local powers), a contest to build new pipelines began. These new pipelines would go through Syria to a port on the Mediterranean coast, and a second corridor would be established through Yemen. Thus, the result was the 2 pipeline wars in Syria and Yemen. The US played a cunning game, by making Iran and the Gulf Arabs fight for this.

When Qatar tried to do a deal with Assad to build a gas pipeline from Qatar to the Mediterranean through Syria, Assad refused, and this deal was given to Iran instead. This prompted the US to start a destabilization campaign in Syria, through its various terrorist proxies. It failed and the Assad government is still standing. The cost to Qatar and the Arabs for the Syrian debacle was some $300 billion plus.

In Yemen, it was the same story. If the Straits of Hormuz were closed, then how would oil flow to world markets? The answer was simple: build a pipeline corridor through Yemen, and ending at a oil terminal on the Arabian Sea.

In Yemen, the political unrest (which began escalating in 2011) rapidly became a major issue for the Saudis, with Houthis taking control of northern Yemen in late 2014, followed by the resignation of President Mansur Hadi and his cabinet. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia began leading a coalition of countries allied against the Houthi rebels.  There was agreement among those Saudi princes heading security services regarding the necessity of a response to the Houthis’ seizure of Sana’a, which had forced the Yemeni government into exile. While MBS sold the war as a quick win on Houthi rebels in Yemen and a way to put President Hadi back in power, however, it became a long war of attrition.

Regarding his role in the military intervention, Mohammed gave his first on-the-record interview on 4 January 2016 to The Economist, which had called him the “architect of the war in Yemen”. Denying the title, he explained the mechanism of the decision-making institutions actually holding stakes in the intervention, including the council of security and political affairs and the ministry of foreign affairs from the Saudi side. He added that the Houthis usurped power in Sana’a before he served as minister of defence. The war and blockade of Yemen has cost Saudi Arabia tens of billions of dollars, further aggravated the humanitarian crisis in the country and destroyed much of Yemen’s infrastructure, but failed to dislodge the Shiite Houthi rebels and their allies from the Yemeni capital.

Qatar

MBZ appeared to have finally enlisted  the  support  of  Saudi  Arabia  (along  with  Egypt  and  Bahrain)  in  forming  an  international  “Anti-Terror  Quartet”  to  effectively  challenge  Qatar.  Qatar was getting too close to Iran, among other issues.  Qatar stood accused of being the Muslim Brotherhood’s chief sponsor and of reneging on earlier secret agreements signed with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Going much further than MBZ’s earlier efforts to push King Abdullah into action, the new Quartet promptly severed ties with Qatar, launched a diplomatic and economic embargo, and soon issued a list of thirteen demands against Qatar.  

  In  his  April  2018  media  interviews,  for  example,  MBS  claimed that the Brotherhood was part of a “triangle of evil” (along with Iran and groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State). He insisted that the “Brotherhood is another extremist organization, they want to use the democratic system to rule countries and build shadow caliphates everywhere, then they would transform into a real Muslim empire.” MBS explained that “one of the reasons we have a problem with Qatar is that we are not allowing them to use the financial system to collect money from Saudis and give it to extremist organizations.” Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain cut diplomatic and trade links with Qatar in June 2017.

The 2017 Coup Attempt

Since 2011, Israel and Saudi Arabia teamed up against the US-Iran deal. In md-2017, Israel’s Mossad warned MBS that the US is about to topple him from power. This would be done by using the pro-American faction within the Saudi elite. When Saudi intelligence went through the names on the CIA list, it was found that many of them were tied into the Rockefeller network, and that this network reached even to members of the royal family.

In May 2017, Mohammed publicly warned “I confirm to you, no one will survive in a corruption case—whoever he is, even if he’s a prince or a minister”. In November 2017, he ordered some 200 wealthy businessmen and princes to be placed under house arrest in The Ritz-Carlton, Riyadh. On 4 November 2017, the Saudi press announced the arrest of the Saudi prince and billionaire Al-Waleed bin Talal, a frequent English-language news commentator and a major shareholder in Citi, News Corp and Twitter, as well as over 40 princes and government ministers at the behest of the Crown Prince on corruption and money laundering charges. Others arrested or fired in the purge included Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard; Minister of Economy and Planning Adel Fakeih; and the commander of the Royal Saudi Navy, Admiral Abdullah bin Sultan bin Mohammed Al-Sultan.

Those arrested in the Ritz Carlton were the subject of what became called “the night of beating”.  The detainees were threatened with blackmail. After many days, the remaining detainees were moved to Al-Ha’ir Prison, while some released are banned from travelling abroad.

The sweeping campaign of arrests was the latest move to reduce the pro-American faction within the Saudi elite, thus reduce the possibility of a CIA-directed   internal coup against MBS,  the favorite son and top adviser of King Salman. The king had decreed the creation of a powerful new anticorruption committee, headed by the crown prince, only hours before the committee ordered the arrests.

In a brilliant move, MBS managed to retrieve a lot of assets that these pro-US Saudis accumulated over the decades. This move netted the Saudi government some $100-150 billion, including properties, artworks, yachts, shares in listed companies, and cash. Additionally, many religious clerics tied through patronage to these disgraced Saudi princes and billionaires, were prompted to speak out against MBS. Even they were locked up-on the basis of treason. The clampdown against corruption resonates with ordinary Saudis who feel that the state has been asking them to accept belt tightening while, at the same time, they see corruption and the power elite accumulating more wealth.  MBS’s reform agenda is widely popular with Saudi Arabia’s burgeoning youth population, but faces resistance from some of the old guard more comfortable with the kingdom’s traditions of incremental change and rule by consensus. According to a former British ambassador to Riyadh, Mohammed “is the first prince in modern Saudi history whose constituency has not been within the royal family, it’s outside it. It’s been young Saudis, particularly younger Saudi men in the street”. The 2018 Arab Youth Survey found that nine out of ten 18–24 year-olds in the MENA region support Mohammed’s campaign against corruption.

The Kasshogji Affair

 Jamal Kasshogji was enlisted by the CIA by his uncle Adnan Kasshogji. Adnan was a small player for the CIA since the mid-1970s. It was only when MBS assumed power, and began pursuing an independent policy that the Rockefeller Empire began to target him. With the failed CIA coup in May 2017, the CIA instructed Jamal to be more aggressive in his accusations against MBS, especially in the social media field. Then, the CIA concocted a plan, knowing full well the enmity between MBS and the pro-US faction within the Saudi elite, and used this to carry out a smear campaign against MBS.

Who knows what really went on in the US consulate in Istanbul? The CIA and M16 are master liars. Remember Putin called them the Empire of Lies.

In October 2018, Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi went missing after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. MBS has denied any involvement in the murder and blamed the assassination on rogue operators- most likely tied to the CIA. On 18 November 2022, due to his new role as the Saudi prime minister; MBS got US immunity over Khashoggi’s murder.

The Aramco Hit

The full story is told in our previous article. The Rockefeller Empire bombed oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, and blamed Iran! The reason for this attack was to pressurise MBS to list Aramco in New York, rather than anywhere else.

MBS & Biden

In 2019, during the Trump administration, Joe Biden criticised MBS, describing him as a pariah due to the 2018 killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. In September 2021, Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan met with MBS. In the meeting, MBS ended up shouting at Sullivan after he raised the killing of Khashoggi. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Saudi Arabia declined U.S. requests to increase oil production and thus undercut Russia’s war finances. The U.S-Saudi relationship was at its lowest point in decades. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia became weak after OPEC+ announced a cut in oil production by two million barrels a day. The US government is angered by the move, accusing Saudi Arabia of siding with Russia in its war against Ukraine. The Saudi government denied these claims, claiming that the move was not politically motivated but to bring stability in global oil markets.

Vision 2030

MBS took the leadership in the restructuring of Saudi Arabia’s economy, which he officially announced in April 2016 when he introduced Vision 2030, the country’s strategic orientation for the next 15 years. Vision 2030 plans to reform Saudi Arabia’s economy towards a more diversified and privatised structure. It details goals and measures in various fields, from developing non-oil revenues and privatisation of the economy to e-government and sustainable development.

One of the major motives behind this economic restructure through Vision 2030 can be traced back to Saudi Arabia’s reliance on a rentier economy, as a limit on oil resources makes its sustainability a problem in the future.

The Saudi-Russia Nexus

The relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia evolved under MBS, granting the two nations the ability to conspire in oil export decisions.

We find several factors behind the dramatic improvement in Saudi-Russian relations. These include the rise of US shale oil production, which undercut OPEC’s market power and pushed Saudi Arabia to seek Russian cooperation. Washington had also been telegraphing weariness of its longstanding hands-on security role in the Middle East and seeking to reduce involvement and costs. Further, Saudi and other Persian Gulf leaders have described a perception of growing unreliability of American defense guarantees. These took the form of US willingness to cut support for partner regimes such as that of Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt and, most shockingly for Riyadh, the American missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019.

When one adds up the long list of attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure, assassination attempts targeting MBS, the constant threats, bullying, and interference in Saudis domestic affairs, MBS has reached the limit of his patience with the US.

MBS holds a worldview that has more in common with Vladimir Putin than with the current US political leadership. At 37 years old, the crown prince looks set to dominate Saudi policymaking for decades to come. The Saudi-Russia friendship already seems to be countering and weakening US influence in Riyadh. Continued improvement in relations with Moscow could portend serious repercussions in Washington. Most significant is the vanishing Saudi willingness to heed US calls to temper global oil prices in line with the political needs of the current administration. Convincing Riyadh to activate spare oil production capacity has historically been among the most effective.

 Then came Covid. On 5 March 2020, OPEC cut its total production of oil, and called upon OPEC+ participants, including Russia, to do the same. Russia rejected the demand to cut oil production and the following day, marking the end of the unofficial partnership with OPEC.  Saudi Arabia consequently boosted production to increase its market share, leading to an oil price war between the countries. Oil prices dropped to negative prices for a while!

The relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia further evolved under MBS, granting the two nations the ability to “co-ordinate” in oil export decisions. Russia is currently a major exporter of refined fuels to the Saudis and other Middle Eastern countries. Subsequent to the 2022 Russian invasion of the Ukraine, Saudi Arabia intensified investments in Russian energy companies. Saudi Arabia and Russia lead the OPEC+ group. The unfolding dynamic is raising the stature of Russian President Vladimir Putin as a powerbroker within OPEC+ and undermining US and allied attempts to isolate Russia in the international community. Saudi Arabia has demonstrated a surprising affinity for Russia on several occasions, from the recent increase in purchase of Russian heavy Mazut fuel oil embargoed by the United States, to MBS’s acceptance of phone calls from Putin, and refusal to take calls from Biden in the weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

Meanwhile, the relations between MBS and Joe Biden soured, as Biden refused to meet with MBS due to his alleged complicity in the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi.  Since Biden took office, he has insulted MBS on a regular basis. No Arab or any world leader would want to meet another leader who is disrespectful and arrogant. In January 2022, the Saudi king also refused Joe Biden’s plea to increase oil production, which indirectly profited Russia.

In July, Biden travelled To Saudi Arabia to beg MBS to increase production. The atmosphere was chilly, to say the least. After the meeting with Biden in Jeddah, MBS and his father the King, left Jeddah for Riyadh, leaving Biden to have lunch with low-level Saudi officials. Biden was sent packing with his tails between his legs. It was the most humiliating diplomatic meeting that an American President had ever faced. The Global South, or the Zone B nations were all over-joyed to witness this fall of American prestige.

The danger has increased for MBS. A vengeful Washington and the Rockefeller Empire will put its assets to work within the Kingdom to attempt a coup against MBS, or try another hit, and hope it succeeds, as the last several attempts all failed.

The Threats

Washington was left with nothing, but the usual threats it is so used to issuing. But, this time, the Saudis couldn’t care. Given the peremptory way in which the core 1945 agreement was ended by MBS, Washington is angry too, as was evidenced in the highly pointed comments from several senior U.S. officials at the time of the OPEC cut, including from Biden himself, who said that: “There’s going to be some consequences for what they’ve done.” OPEC’s collective decision to decrease output by about two million barrels of oil per day elicited strong reactions in the US in particular, and there was even talk of “declarations of war.”

 In addition to the threat of the 9/11 victims, there was always the threat of the NOPEC bill coming into law. By now, we all know that the 9-11 incidents were done under orders by David Rockefeller. But, the Saudis were blamed. The Empire of Lies at work!

Following the overriding by the U.S. Congress of former President Barack Obama’s veto of the ‘Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act’, making it possible for victims’ families to sue the government of Saudi Arabia, at least seven major lawsuits alleging Saudi government support and funding for the ‘9/11’ terrorist attack have so far landed in federal courts.

Making matters even worse was Saudi’s decision to threaten the U.S. shale industry if Washington passed into law the ‘No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act’ (NOPEC). This bill was founded upon the supposition – which still hangs in the air like a Damoclean Sword above the Saudis’ heads – that OPEC is a cartel and that, as such, Aramco – as the principal vehicle of the leading member of OPEC, Saudi Arabia – violates the U.S. (and U.K.’s) stringent anti-trust laws.

If this NOPEC bill became law, then Washington can sue Aramco, and seize (steal) Saudi Arabia’s assets and investments within the US (about $123 billion in US Treasuries plus another $40-50 billion in various investments within the US). Were this to happen, although Riyadh will lose nearly $200 billion, the loss and harm to the Rockefeller Empire and Washington would be much greater in magnitude. But, hey, one can expect anything to emerge from the clownish, idiotic political class in Washington. And, they are getting desperate with each passing week

Not long after Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s visit to Riyadh, the Saudis informed Washington that if the NOPEC bill is passed, then the Saudis would dump its holdings of US treasury bonds-some $110 billion as at end November, 2022.

OPEC is as relevant as ever

OPEC and ten non-OPEC energy producers – including Russia – have been coordinating their production policy since December 2016. At the time, analysts gave this “OPEC-plus” format little chance of having an impact.

In contrast to the escapades in the oil market between 1973 and 1985, when there was little consensus among OPEC’s members and many had already written the organization’s obituary – today, former rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Russia are managing to converge their interests into powerful cards. In those days, it was normal practice for Riyadh to take into account and execute Washington’s interests within OPEC: A single phone call from the US capital was enough. When the US oil company ARAMCO – which acted like an extended arm of the US in the kingdom – was nationalized by Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s as part of the sweeping nationalization trends around the world, compensation was promised to the US on a mere handshake. The era of the “Seven Sisters,” a cartel of oil companies that divided up the oil market, came to an end then. However, for US policymakers – at least, psychologically – this era still persists. “It’s our oil,” is an expression often heard uttered in Washington.

To really understand the core of the conflict in Ukraine – where a proxy war rages – one must break down the confrontation thus: The US and its European allies, who represent and back the global financial sector, are essentially engaged in a battle against the world’s energy sector.

Riyadh is warming up to the idea of trading oil in other currencies, as indicated this year in discussions with the Chinese to trade in yuan. The Saudis also continue to purchase Russian oil like other West Asian and Global South states; they have opted to ignore western sanctions on Moscow, and are increasingly preparing for the new international condition of multi-polarity.

Washington, thus, no longer maintains its ability to exert absolute leverage on OPEC, which is now repositioning itself geopolitically as the enlarged OPEC+.

 Saudi-China Ties – Rise of the Petro-Yuan

Ties between these 2 countries have existed for many years, and has been intensifying since the 1980s. In November 1993, China became a net oil importer, for the first time.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has accepted a personal invitation by MBS to visit the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Here, he is set to attend a number of summits including a China-Saudi Summit, an unprecedented China-Arab States Summit and a China-Gulf Cooperation Council (China-GCC) summit. The meetings will involve 14 other heads of states from the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and more.

Beijing may have lost huge export markets within the collective west – so a replacement was needed. The Arab leaders who lined up in Riyadh to meet Xi saw ten thousand sharpened (western) knives suddenly approaching and calculated it was time to strike a new balance. That means, among other things, that MBS has adopted a more multipolar agenda: no more funding terrorism across Eurasia, and a door wide open to the Russia-China strategic partnership.  “China will continue to import a lot of crude, long-term, from GCC nations, and way more LNG. Beijing will strengthen our cooperation in the upstream sector, engineering services, as well as downstream storage, transportation, and refinery. The Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange platform will be fully utilized for RMB settlement in oil and gas trade…and we could start currency swap cooperation.”

 “GCC oil flowing East + renminbi invoicing = the dawn of the petroyuan.” To describe the visit as a “milestone” in China’s relations with the Middle East is accurate. It is a sign of a strategic shift towards a multipolar world. The sides come together in merging a shared set of economic, strategic and security objectives, showing the United States that it cannot dictate to Middle East states who they should and should not have partnerships with.

For most of recent history, the states of the Arab world have been understood to be divided in two groups. On the one hand, there are “clients” of the West, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar. On the other hand, there are outright enemies, including Bashar Assad’s Syria and the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. This is because, in the early 20th century, Western nations designed a Middle East that would supplement their hegemony over itself. Their goal was to create a series of client states who served their interests in terms of access to energy and military, while suppressing any revolutionary states that sought to oppose Western dominance in the region.

With this arrangement, the states of the Persian Gulf grew tremendously wealthy through a mutual agreement to provide energy to Western nations in exchange for projecting their military influence across the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been a critical partner of the United States, while the United Arab Emirates gives air-base access to several Western countries. The West preserves the independence of these countries, while helping them contain revisionist neighbors such as Ba’athist-era Iraq and contemporary Iran.

But the world is changing. The partnership between the West and Arab states is borne out of mutual strategic interests, not ideology or fraternity. They are business partners, not allies, and throughout the past several decades the United States has demonstrated its penchant for causing enormous upheaval, devastation and destruction across the Middle East which has been disadvantageous to all. While the US may have supported its partners in the Gulf, it has always been an obvious and pressing factor that Washington is only really interested in its own hegemony, and has no true respect for the sovereignty, culture or interests of the countries of the region. Saudi Arabia and similar states may have been tacitly supportive of many things the US has done throughout the Middle East, but we should remember, they are monarchic states based on a conservative rendering of Islam, and do not share the American concept of “human rights.”

Therefore, the rise of China has proven to be critically important for Arab states. Beijing’s emergence as a superpower is prompting countries in the Middle East to diversify their strategic objectives and balance themselves away from a decades-long Western dependency, which can incur many liabilities down the road. China is different to the United States – not only is it a much larger consumer of oil and gas (because of its population size and sparse resources), but also wields a diplomatic position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and a respect for national sovereignty. For Middle East countries, faced with decades of US-led campaigns and interference around them, this is extremely valuable.

If the Saudi regime does indeed embrace substantial trade in currencies other than the dollar as part of its oil-export business, this would signal a shift away from the dollar as the dominant currency in global oil payments. Or measured another way, this would signal the end of the so-called petrodollar.  With the increasingly frequent Saudi comments about trading in nondollar currencies, we’ve also seen an increasing number of pundits announcing the “collapse” of the dollar or the imminent implosion of the dollar’s currently outsized global power. The end of the petrodollar would indeed weaken the dollar, even if this would not be a mortal blow in itself. Moreover, it is especially foolhardy to ignore the status of the petrodollar because that status also has geopolitical implications. As the dollar declines, the US regime will no longer be able to monetize debt and heap up immense new deficits without fear of high price inflation or falling Treasury prices. The end of the petrodollar is not a reason to panic right now, but it is the latest sign that the US regime’s power via the dollar is being reined in.

Meanwhile, the share of US dollars in the reserves of foreign central banks has fallen, dropping from 71 percent twenty years ago to 60 percent today. This is a twenty-five year low. Russia, China, and India all have shown interest in freeing the global economy from the dollar. Even if this trend continues, demand for the dollar will most certainly not disappear next week or next month, or next year. There is still a hoard of trillions of dollars’ worth of dollar-denominated debt in the global economy, and—for now, at least—that means continuing demand for dollars.

 A movement away from the dollar—even in slow motion—will mean a rising cost of living for Americans. With fewer foreigners holding on to dollars, the US regime’s current runaway monetary inflation will create more domestic price inflation. In other words, movement away from the dollar will mean the US regime must engage in less monetization of the nation’s debt if it wishes to avoid runaway inflation. It also likely will lead to a need to pay higher interest rates on US government bonds, and that will mean a need for more taxpayer money to service the debt. It will mean that it will become more difficult for the US regime to finance every new war, program, and pet project that Washington can think up. The more obvious short-term effects of the move away from the petrodollar will be in geopolitics rather than in the currency order. In addition to signaling that it is no longer wedded to the dollar, Saudi Arabia has also recently announced its openness toward Russia and a willingness to join the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) nations. This shift in strategic interests for Saudi Arabia potentially poses an immediate threat to US strategic interests, in that the US regime has become accustomed to dominating the entire Persian Gulf region through the US’s Saudi ties. A Saudi turn away from the petrodollar will magnify this shift. That will be enough to further threaten the American standard of living, but not enough in itself to end the dollar. After all, the pound sterling did not cease to exist after its own fall from its vaunted position as the preferred global reserve currency. But it did become far less powerful. The dollar is headed in the same direction.

As a result, as the geopolitical picture of the world has turned towards multipolarity and competition between the US, China and others, Arab countries have embraced China as a new benefactor which can bring substantial economic, diplomatic, and strategic benefits over the previous arrangements they had. The US previously sought to impose many demands regarding China on Arab countries, such as trying to coerce the UAE to ban Huawei from its 5G networks. Abu Dhabi told Washington where to go. Beyond the China matter, the issue of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has also been a growing sore point between the US and Arab states, especially on the issue of oil production. The common theme between both instances? The US believed it could force its unilateral will on Arab countries, only to be rebuffed. The China-Arab summits thus reflect the shift in mood – the Arab states are ready to diversify and expand their partnerships to entrench their positions, so that countries such as America may ultimately be forced to accept them as equals.

The Arab states were only ever partners, not allies to the US, and had no fundamental loyalty beyond the factor of who could provide their states with the most benefits, turning a blind eye to decades of US-led wars and destruction across the region. Now, the rise of China has signaled a new source of wealth, opportunity, and security for the Arab World, leading them to hedge their bets. Saudi Arabia was the largest oil exporter, while the US was the world’s largest oil importer. Over the past 2 decades, the US began to reduce its imports of Saudi oil. While, in the past 2 decades, China has become the world’s largest oil importer- AND, Saudi Arabia is still the world’s largest oil exporter, as well as China’s oil supplier. So, these blossoming energy-economic ties can only strengthen in the future.

There have been HINTS in the media from Saudi officials about the need to sell its energy for currencies besides the dollar, whether it be the yuan, the rupee, or any other currency of its major trading partners. But, it is only a hint for the moment. MBS (in conjunction with Putin) is increasing the pressure on the Rockefeller Empire. Were MBS to implement this new oil sale policy by selling energy for other currencies, then the Rockefeller Empire will unleash all its dogs to kill MBS and destabilize Saudi Arabia.

In this scenario, one can expect both the US and Israel will try hard to create more conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is for this reason; MBS and Iran are becoming closer. Were a peace deal to happen between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it would remove any possibility for the 2 families to ignite war in the region; their policy of “divide-and-rule” will no more work. It will also provide a reason for the eviction of US military forces from the region. And, there goes Israel.

Ever since the start of Ukraine’s military conflict in February 2022, we have essentially been watching the western-led financial industry waging its war against the eastern-dominated energy economy. The momentum will always be with the latter, because as stated above, in contrast to money, energy cannot be printed. The oil and gas volumes needed to replace Russian energy sources cannot be found on the world market within a year. And no commodity is more global than oil. Any changes in the oil market will always influence the world’s economy. “Oil makes and breaks nations.” The late former Saudi oil minister Zaki Yamani once described oil alliances as being stronger than Catholic marriages. If that is the case, then the old US-Saudi marriage is currently undergoing estrangement and Russia has filed for divorce from Europe.

A final point to note is that the petro-dollar had a violent birth. Its demise will be even more violent and destructive.

Conclusion

There are FIVE major power centers in the world. They are London (the Rothschilds), New York (the Rockefellers), Moscow (run by nationalists under Putin), Beijing (run by nationalists under Xi), and, lastly Riyadh. All the major and most crucial decisions regarding major geopolitical events, etc are made in these 5 centers of power.

 Since the rise of the British Empire in the early 1800s, the controlling family –the Rothschilds- and London have called the shots, globally. Since 1945 till 2022, the US and the controlling family-the Rockefellers have called the shots globally. Since the early 2000s, with America’s disastrous forays in the region, US influence and power began to decline. American power has declined over the past 2 decades, In the same time period, the power and influence of the other 3 centers – Moscow, Beijing and Riyadh- has been on the rise. The coming few years will solidify this trend. And, amongst these three powers, Riyadh will emerge as the most powerful center of power in the world.

There are 3 major reasons for this. These facts may not be easy for many to digest, but it is what it is -like it or not, this is the reality-and devoid of any emotion.

1. Saudi Arabia is the geographical center of the world. It connects east to west, and north to south.
2. It has the most oil reserves in the world, AND, at the lowest “lifting costs” (less than $1 per barrel) in the world.
3. It is the home-base of Islam-the world’s fastest growing religion.

The West is, once again, on the losing side. It’s not a position they are comfortable with. The next few articles will clarify the corner that the West finds itself in.