1. Bashar Asad – the reluctant ruler

2.  Syria Today         

3.  Israel’s Plan for Syria

4.  The US plans for Syria

5.  Iran & Syria

6.  Turkey & Syria

7.  HTS-the NATO strike force

1 Bashar Asad – the Reluctant Ruler

But it was not solely internal factors that brought about this outcome. Syria became a battleground for geopolitical rivalries, where external powers exploited the crisis to advance their own agendas. From Western and Arab states backing the opposition to the direct involvement of foreign actors on Syrian soil, every side pursued its own goals, further deepening the conflict. Regional players like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel saw Syria’s weakening as an opportunity to bolster their own influence. Yet for years, these plans failed to materialize due to the robust support Syria received from Russia and Iran. The intervention of militants and terrorist groups added to the chaos, turning the struggle for power into a lawless war.

A key turning point came when Assad lost the support of even those who had stood by him for years. Economic hardships, sanctions, and a growing sense of hopelessness led many to believe that change was inevitable, even if it came at the cost of destruction. The strategic mistake of the ruling elite – betting on a military solution to the conflict while ignoring political dialogue, both domestically and internationally – ultimately left Assad vulnerable to determined and well-organized adversaries.

Another significant factor was Assad’s own persona. Born in 1965 into the family of Hafez Assad, Syria’s long-time leader, Bashar had no initial ambitions for a political career, choosing instead to pursue medicine. Educated as an ophthalmologist in Damascus and later specializing in London, he was seen as a secular and educated figure, far removed from the cruder aspects of Middle Eastern politics. However, a family tragedy – the death of his elder brother Basil – altered his destiny, forcing him to return to Syria and assume the role of his father’s successor. In 2000, following Hafez Assad’s death, Bashar ascended to the presidency, inheriting a nation with great potential but riddled with deep internal contradictions.

Over the years, Bashar Assad found himself at the center of mounting challenges. Corruption within his inner circle, international pressure, and a protracted war drained both the country and Assad personally.

Another blow came with his wife Asma’s battle with cancer, which she has fought for years. These circumstances likely influenced his willingness to consider change. Media outlets frequently reported that Assad was ready to hand over power to the opposition, although no solid evidence supported this claim. Perhaps war fatigue, personal tragedies, and the realization of inevitable transformation made him more open to compromise. The Russian Foreign Ministry recently confirmed that following negotiations with various armed factions within Syria, Assad decided to step down from the presidency, leave the country, and ensure a peaceful transfer of power.

It can be inferred that Bashar’s lack of training for the role, and his incompatible disposition likely led to his not being a good military commander-in-chief. By all accounts, Assad appeared aloof when it came to the running of his army, leaving everything to his generals who—according to some—resulted in the slow degradation and corruption of many high level military officials. We can never know quite for certain how much blame rests with him, but these are educated deductions based on both sides’ accounts. The soft-spoken, mild-mannered, intelligent ruler may not have had the required gravitas to properly thrive in a barbarous region overrun with vicious enemies on all sides. This, along with the many native traitors now condemning him, has led some to express the sentiment that: “Syria did not deserve Assad.” In some ways it feels like no country deserves his kind of thoughtful, temperate leader with such an exemplary and graceful first wife and family.

2 Syria Today

So what went wrong? Everything.

Assad’s Syria had been rotting from within for years. The country was locked in a perpetual humanitarian and economic crisis, with 90% of Syrians living in poverty and widespread malnutrition. Desperate families took out loans just to buy food but couldn’t pay them back. Power outages crippled even Damascus, sometimes leaving the capital dark for 20 hours a day. Electricity prices soared by up to 585% in the spring of 2024 alone, pushing an already destitute population deeper into despair.

The Assad government offered no solutions – only mounting repression. Under crushing sanctions, Damascus couldn’t secure foreign loans, and with its oil fields under US-Kurdish control, there was nothing left to trade. Even Syria’s illicit drug trade, once a lifeline, couldn’t plug the gaping holes in state finances. Profits disappeared into the pockets of warlords and traffickers, not the state treasury.

Meanwhile, Assad’s underpaid, demoralized army, bled dry by years of civil war, and continued to disintegrate. The monthly pay for soldiers was $7, while that of general are $40!  For a time, Iranian proxies like Hezbollah propped up his forces, but by 2024, they’d shifted their attention to fighting Israel. Attempts to draw Russia further into Syria’s quagmire fell flat. Moscow, busy elsewhere, had no interest in bailing Assad out. So when the final crisis hit, Assad found himself alone. His allies stayed away, his army scattered, and an enraged, starving populace turned on the government. There was no one left to protect him.

Let’s start with former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s surrender. Qatari diplomats, off the record, maintain that Assad tried to negotiate a transfer of power with the armed opposition That’s what was discussed in detail between Russia, Iran, and Turkey behind closed doors in Doha this past weekend, during the last sigh of the moribund “Astana process” to demilitarize Syria. The transfer of power negotiation failed. Hence, Assad was offered asylum by Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. That explains why both Iran and Russia instantly changed the terminology while still in Doha, and began to refer to the “legitimate opposition” in a bid to distinguish non-militant reformists from the armed extremists cutting a swathe across the state.  What happened after the funeral in Doha was quite murky, suggesting a western Intel remote-controlled coup, developing as fast as lightning, complete with reports of domestic betrayals. 

The original Astana idea was to keep Damascus safe and to have Ankara manage HTS. Yet Assad had already committed a serious strategic blunder, believing in lofty promises by NATO messaged through his newfound Arab leader friends in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. To his own astonishment,  Assad finally realized how fragile his own position was, having turned down military assistance from his stalwart regional allies, Iran and Hezbollah, believing that his new Arab allies might keep him safe. The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) was in shambles after 13 years of war and ruthless US sanctions. Logistics were prey to deplorable corruption. The rot was systemic. But importantly, while many were prepared to fight the foreign-backed terror groups once again, insiders say Assad never fully deployed his army to counterattack the onslaught.

Tehran and Moscow tried everything – up to the last minute. In fact, Assad was already in deep trouble since his visit to Moscow on 29 November that reaped no tangible results. The Damascus establishment thus regarded Russia’s insistence that Assad must abandon his previous red lines on negotiating a political settlement as a de facto signal pointing to the end.  Apart from doing nothing to prevent the increasing atrophy and collapse of the SAA, Assad did nothing to rein in Israel, which has been bombing Syria non-stop for years. Until the very last moment, Tehran was willing to help: two brigades were ready to get into Syria, but it would take at least two weeks to deploy them. 

The Fars News Agency explained the mechanism in detail – from the Syrian leadership’s inexorable lack of motivation to fight the terror brigades to Assad ignoring serious warnings from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei since June, all the way to two months ago, with other Iranian officials warning that HTS and its foreign backers were preparing a blitzkrieg. According to the Iranians: 

“After Aleppo fell, it became clear that Assad had no real intentions of staying in power, so we started to engage in diplomatic talks with the opposition, and arranged the safe exit of our troops from Syria. If the SAA does not fight, neither will we risk our soldiers’ lives. Russia and the UAE had managed to convince him to step down, so there was nothing we could do.” There’s no Russian confirmation that they convinced Assad to step down: one just needs to interpret that failed meeting in Moscow on 29 November. Yet, significantly, there is confirmation, before that, about Turkey knowing everything about the HTS offensive as far back as six months ago. 

3 Israel’s Long-Term Plans for Syria

 “It is written that the future of Jerusalem is to expand to Damascus,” –Smotrich.

 Avigdor Lieberman – “If Syria continues to serve as a logistical base for our enemies; we will seize the Syrian part of Mount Hermon and will not relinquish it until further notice.” Over the past decade, Syria has faced hundreds of Israeli air attacks claiming to primarily target weapons manufacturing, transport, and storage facilities. According to Tel Aviv, these strikes are intended to “cut off supply routes” from Iran to Lebanon’s Hezbollah. 

Since the launch of Al-Aqsa Flood, Israeli strikes have focused on repeatedly targeting Hezbollah positions, and have targeted units tasked with transporting drone components and other technology from Iran to Lebanon. Storage facilities, whether domestically produced or imported from Russia and Iran, have also been hit. With the launch of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood more than a year ago, Israeli strikes on Syria intensified, reaching 29 by the end of 2023. And since the start of this year, Syria has been subjected to 69 air attacks targeting multiple geographical areas, in addition to 17 attacks on Syrian–Lebanese crossings since mid-September.  The attacks coincided with the occupation state’s rapid military escalation against Lebanon six weeks ago, beginning with the pagers attack on 16-17 September and culminating in the assassinations of high-ranking leaders of the Lebanese resistance. Israeli airstrikes against Syria have significantly increased since the expansion of the war against Lebanon in late September, with near-daily strikes major cities. Some attacks hit close to Russia’s base in the western Latakia governorate, prompting Moscow’s forces to activate air defence systems. 

The Rothschild’s aim is to bring into reality the Greater Israel project.  We see that the eastern borders end at the Euphrates River, while the western border is the Nile River. The US has bases bordering the Euphrates River in the northwest. Coincidence? Definitely not.

Targeting Hezbollah supplies – Strategic Challenges facing Damascus 

Israel has recently stepped up its violent and illegal campaign of airstrikes against Syria, particularly Syrian–Lebanese border crossings, which Tel Aviv says it is targeting to cut off the flow of weapons into Lebanon, where it is waging a brutal and deadly campaign.  Radar and air defense installations in southern Syria have also come under fire, as well as repeated attacks on research centers Israel claims are focused on missile production and development.

Tel Aviv has also increasingly targeted Syrian since October 2023 and the subsequent opening of multiple resistance support fronts in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Israel has bombed Aleppo and Damascus international airports 12 times, alleging these civilian facilities are used to transport materials for producing and assembling missiles, either for use in Syria or for shipment to Lebanon. 

Israeli targets have also expanded to focusing on facilities allegedly involved in weapons storage, manufacturing, and training.

  From Lebanon to Iran, militants have infinite hiding places and hundreds of miles of underground tunnels to transport supplies and personnel. Hezbollah’s arsenals include a wide range of missiles and drones. Other components of the arsenal include several generations of the famed Russian and Igla-S surface-to-air missile systems. Additionally, Hezbollah has been reported to possess since 2006, obtained from Syria, which have a range of up to 300 kilometers. The capability to down Israeli drones has raised Israeli suspicions that the Pantsir air defense system, along with advanced Russian SA-22 systems, has also been transferred from Syria to Hezbollah. These indicators, coupled with Israel’s military mobilization along the Golan front, shifting lines of engagement, and capitulatory demands conveyed by US special envoy  for deploying international forces to monitor the Syrian–Lebanese border, all reflect the predicaments facing Damascus – and make clear that Israel intends to expand its war to the Syrian front. 

Israel’s repeated accusations against Syria’s support for the Lebanese resistance, even when it merely provides humanitarian assistance during Lebanon’s crisis, reveal the motivations behind the occupation state’s continued targeting and threats against the Syrian state. But can a little country like Israel triumph against Syria’s vast, complex geographical terrain, where, unlike Lebanon, there are thousands more miles, and thousands more hidden sites for weapons and supplies to proliferate?

4 America’s Plan for Syria

Most people are unaware of how pipeline politics have shaped events in Syria making the country a target for US aggression. But from 1949 until today, US intelligence services have tried repeatedly to topple the leader of the Syrian government in order to oversee and control a Trans-Arabian Pipeline “intended to connect the oil fields of Saudi Arabia to the ports of Lebanon via Syria.”

The CIA began its active meddling in Syria in 1949—barely a year after the agency’s creation. Syrian patriots had declared war on the Nazis, expelled their Vichy French colonial rulers and crafted a fragile secularist democracy based on the American model. But in March 1949, Syria’s democratically elected president, Shukri-al-Quwatli, hesitated to approve the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, an American project intended to connect the oil fields of Saudi Arabia to the ports of Lebanon via Syria. i n retaliation for Al-Quwatli’s lack of enthusiasm for the U.S. pipeline, the CIA engineered a coup replacing al-Quwatli with the CIA’s handpicked dictator, a convicted swindler named Husni al-Za’im. Al-Za’im barely had time to dissolve parliament and approve the American pipeline before his countrymen deposed him, four and a half months into his regime. Washington’s long history of covert action against Syria is well documented.

The Oil Factor

The US had “officially withdrawn from Iraq about 10 years ago. This was a farce as they maintained multiple bases in the country. Nonetheless, their presence in Iraq was reduced. This vacuum gave opportunities for both Russia and China to move into Iraq’s oil and gas sectors. Iraq has oil reserves totaling some 150 billion barrels. And much more is believed to be still discovered, especially in its western regions- the Al Anbar province.

At around that time, Russia had effectively taken over the oil sector of Iraqi Kurdistan, and was keen to quickly leverage this into a similar presence in rest of Iraq. Securing major gas oil and contracts in the south of the country as well as the north would further allow Moscow to establish enormous political sway across the entire Shia crescent of power in the Middle East, stretching from Syria through Lebanon (by dint of Iran), Jordan, Iraq (also helped by Iran), Iran itself, and Yemen (via Iran).    From this base, it could effectively challenge the U.S.’s then-vital oil, gas, and political ally in the region – Saudi Arabia.

  Consequently, in late 2017 a new cooperation roadmap was agreed between and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping. This included effectively dividing up Iran and Iraq into areas of specific interest for each side, when also factoring in other countries in the region of long-term strategic interest to both sides. As Russia had already secured the northern Iraqi Kurdistan region, and was heavily present in Syria, among other regional operations, it was decided China would take the lead role in Iraq and a bigger role in Iran too. As a result, new all-encompassing co-operation agreements between China and Iraq (the 2019 ‘Oil for Reconstruction and Investment Agreement’, later expanded into the 2021 ‘Iraq-China Framework Agreement’) and then China and Iran (the 2020‘China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement’, were struck.

In this context, it — and the other two big gas fields, Akkas and Siba — form a skewed triangle across southern Iraq, stretching from the eastern Iraqi border with Iran , down south close to the key Iraqi Basra export hub , and then all the way west across to the Iraqi border with Syria . Along the spine of this entire area running from east to west are the historical ultra-nationalist and ultra-anti-West cities of Fallujah, Ramadi, Hit and Haditha and at the point geographically, Iraq turns into Syria.

  From there it is just a short hop to the key strategic ports of Banias and Tartus, and to Latakia – all three of which are crucial globally strategic sites for Moscow.  The Syrian port of Tartus remains a huge naval base for Russia and the only Mediterranean port to which it has access. The port is just a short ride from Khmeimim airport, which – under a deal struck in 2015 – became a dual-use civilian-military airport-airbase for use by Russia. And just a short flight away from those two key assets is Russia’s Latakia intelligence-gathering listening station.

For both Russia and Iran, the securing of the spine of Iraq running from the western border of Iran, across Iraq, and through and across Syria is crucial to the development of the Banias port and its surrounding infrastructure in Syria. This has long been earmarked as the end point for the long-planned Iran-Iraq-Syria pipelines that would move Iranian oil and gas from Iran through Iraq to Syria, and then into the less rigorously policed ports of southern Europe. It has also long been the final part of Russian and Iranian plans to build a ‘Land Bridge’ from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea by which they could exponentially increase the scale and scope of weapons delivery into southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights area of Syria to be used in attacks on Israel .

The core aim of this policy is to provoke a slow-burn broader conflict in the Middle East that will inexorably draw in the U.S. and its allies into an unwinnable war of the sort seen recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. By placing itself in the geographical heart of this route at intervals along the spine of Iraq, China will be able to continue to play the directing role in how and when Russia and Iran develop their long-term geopolitical strategies across the region and beyond.

 The 13-year-old Syrian campaign is not really aimed at Syria, but Iran. Syria is just the last obstacle on the path to Tehran, but Tehran is the icing on the cake. Crush Iran and Israel takes the ‘top spot’ in the Middle East; it becomes the regional hegemon overnight. Meanwhile—Uncle Sam gains access to the pipeline corridors it has sought for over 2 decades, corridors that will transport natural gas from Qatar to the Mediterranean and then onward to markets in Europe. The gas will be provided by a US puppet, extracted by western oil companies, sold in US Dollars, and used to maintain a stranglehold on European politics. At the same time, all other competitors will be sanctioned, sabotaged or excluded entirely. (Nordstream)

The US war against Bashar Assad did not begin with the peaceful civil protests of the Arab Spring in 2011. Instead it began in 2009, when Qatar proposed to construct a $10 billion, 1,500 kilometer pipeline through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Turkey. Qatar shares with Iran the South Pars/North Dome gas field, the world’s richest natural gas repository. The international trade embargo until recently prohibited Iran from selling gas abroad. Meanwhile, Qatar’s gas can reach European markets only if it is liquefied and shipped by sea, a route that restricts volume and dramatically raises costs. The proposed pipeline would have linked Qatar directly to European energy markets via distribution terminals in Turkey, which would pocket rich transit fees. The Qatar/Turkey pipeline would give the Sunni kingdoms of the Persian Gulf decisive domination of world natural gas markets and strengthen Qatar, America’s closest ally in the Arab world. Qatar hosts two massive American military bases and the U.S. Central Command’s Mideast headquarters. 

For Russia, this pipeline would be in competition to Russian pipeline gas to the EU. Remember the 2014 Israeli assault on Gaza was done to teach both Putin and the PA that, “don’t get into bed with Russia over the gas offshore Gaza”. This helps to explain why Syria factors so largely in US geopolitical plans to control critical resources as a way to preserve the dominance of the dollar and to contain China’s explosive economic growth. The US is determined to control the vast resources of the Middle East to maintain its privileged position in the global order.

Assad further enraged the Gulf’s Sunni monarchs by endorsing a Russian-approved “Islamic pipeline” running from Iran’s side of the gas field through Syria and to the ports of Lebanon. The Islamic pipeline would make Shiite Iran, not Sunni Qatar, the principal supplier to the European energy market and dramatically increase Tehran’s influence in the Middle East and the world. Israel also was understandably determined to derail the Islamic pipeline, which would enrich Iran and Syria and presumably strengthen their proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. Secret cables and reports by the U.S., Saudi and Israeli intelligence agencies indicate that the moment Assad rejected the Qatari pipeline, military and intelligence planners quickly arrived at the consensus that fomenting a Sunni uprising in Syria to overthrow the uncooperative Bashar Assad was a feasible path to achieving the shared objective of completing the Qatar/Turkey gas link. In 2009, soon after Bashar Assad rejected the Qatar pipeline, the CIA began funding opposition groups in Syria. It is important to note that this was well before the Arab Spring-engendered uprising against Assad. 

5 The Turkey-Iran Angle

Despite the large number of Iranian military facilities – including 52 military bases and 177 additional sites in Aleppo – Iranian forces have failed to take decisive action against the advancing terrorist groups.

Turkey has a growing military presence in Syria, with 12 bases and 114 military sites, including a significant concentration in Aleppo and Idlib. While Iranian forces remain larger in number, Ankara’s military capabilities – particularly in air defense, artillery, and modern communications technology—make it an increasingly influential player in the Syrian conflict.

This shift in power dynamics has allowed Turkey to bolster its position in Syria, with an ability to control various armed groups under its patronage, though it does not officially acknowledge this. Through its actions, Ankara is consolidating its influence, particularly in Aleppo, where it is positioned to play a central role in the conflict’s future trajectory. The geopolitical struggle is intensifying. The Syrian conflict reflects the broader struggle for influence between regional powers like Turkey and Iran. Ankara’s military engagement in Syria is likely to continue to expand, as its influence becomes increasingly critical to the region’s future stability.  Turkey had been frustrated with Assad’s repeated refusal to come to the negotiating table and meet with Erdogan, although both Syrian and Turkish defense and intelligence chiefs have met regularly in Russia. Erdogan wants Assad to legitimize the Turkish occupation of Idlib, as well as Aleppo. Naturally, a leader of a sovereign country will not agree to ceding land under military pressure.

6 The Syria-Iran Relations

Iran is also worried about Assad’s change in posture. Since the conclusion of the Astana Process, Assad has been making overtures to the Arab states, while distancing Syria from Iran. Remember, when Syria was about to be overrun by the terrorists, both Iran and Hezbollah stepped in and saved the day. This was in early 2013, and two years later, Russia stepped inhale-Assad has been negotiating through his ministers while relying on the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Russia for the diplomatic push. Yet, while the finger of blame has been pointed at Turkey, the factor cannot be discounted. From June, the IRGC warned Asad about the HTS in Idlib- that they were preparing a new push for Aleppo.  It was reiterated again in September. Asad ignored this warning. When the coup started, Iran had 2 brigades waiting at the border to move in, but Asad was hesitant and unsure. Asad’s delay became fatal. Iranian hardliner and expert on Syrian affairs Sohail Karimi claims that the reformist government of Pezeshkian does not allow Iranian troops to fight in Syria:

“We are not allowed to fight in Syria. We gave 6,000 martyrs in Syria to fight these terrorists; their death should not be in vain…”

And here former deputy of the Iranian Quds forces says Turks and other Arab countries deceived Tehran, which was reportedly ‘worried about movement in Idlib two months ago’.

“We asked the Turks and some Arab countries and received assurances that there would be no movement. Hakan Fidan in particular told us this. I wish we had not been deceived by them and had taken precautions and reinforced our forces in Syria.” The Iranian FM mentions that Assad himself was shocked at his own army’s collapse. The FM implies Assad had poor working knowledge of the internal situation of his own military, which we’ll get to in a moment.

Then he lays it out:

“It must be said that the path did not progress as well as expected, and Mr. Assad’s government in this regard was somewhat inflexible and slow in making progress.” In reality, people in their confusion have blamed everyone. Many for instance blame Russia, and perhaps Iran, for not allowing Syria to “go all the way” in 2018-2020, to finish off Idlib, which would have prevented all the foregoing events. The same goes for locking Syria into the Astana and Sochi agreements. The problem is, such people have short memories and do not realize the situation was not so simple. Though Syria churned through the jihadists’ strongholds in the 2018-2020 campaign, the fact of the matter is Idlib was deemed strictly off limits by both Turkey and the US:

You might ask: surely Russia isn’t afraid of both Turkey and the US and could protect Syria against them both? Well, Russia tried in February 2019 — where both the Russian and Syrian air force devastated Turkish columns, leaving nearly 40 Turkish troops dead.

The problem is, this angered Turkey which then launched Bayraktar drones in devastating swaths of Syrian armor and personnel. Depending on whom you believe, the SAA was effectively “crippled” by the attacks, having lost nearly 100 pieces of heavy armor, artillery, air defense, and hundreds of men or more. As you can see, ideas about conquering Idlib at the time aren’t as realistic as some believe. The US and Turkey were both prepared to go to war to save their Al-Qaeda stronghold, and Russia astutely saw fit to compromise and “quit while they were ahead”, since the SAA had just recaptured huge amounts of land up to the Idlib deconfliction zone; and so Russia and Turkey formalized another addendum to the Astana process to deconflict at that time.

Think about it from Russia’s perspective, western Syria was mostly recaptured save for a tiny strip in the north—was WWIII really worth trying to recapture one last town whose residents hate Assad to begin with? It wasn’t Russia’s fault that after that time—as we now know—Syria began a slow painful decline, owing to the US’ economic terror and strangulation of its economy.

Fabled Gen Javad Ghaffari, former number two to Gen Soleimani, a specialist in all war on terror vectors, has arrived from Iran to help. By the way, in 2020 he wanted to go all the way to Idlib. That’s why Assad demanded he would have to leave; Damascus opted to freeze the war. Now it’s a completely different ball game.

7 HTS’s New Image New Image & its Support

 How Joulani cleans up-The CIA turned a “lemon “into a “lemonade “

Firstly, the attack by HTS and various ‘rebel’ groups was well organized and clearly planned over a long time period—two years, by one account, which just ‘happens’ to coincide with Russia being tied down in Ukraine at the start of 2022. They admitted this much themselves after capturing Aleppo, in one interview explaining how long they had planned every detail of Aleppo’s capture. The natural kneejerk reaction is that a large intelligence failure on Russia, Syria, and Iran’s behalf allowed this to occur under wraps. But it must be said several reports as far back as September seemed to indicate HTS and co. were planning an attack of this sort.

The next element was that, despite obviously being an incorrigible terrorist, HTS’ leader Al-Joulani is an intelligent, savvy, and influential leader who has not only consolidated power, but has been busily coalition-building these past few years. Under his stewardship, HTS has attempted to rebrand itself away from the ‘jihadi’ movement into a new broader form of ‘nationalism’ that seeks to win with ‘honey’ what couldn’t be won with vinegar. This is what’s prompted the rash of MSM articles attempting to whitewash Joulani and his movement: Let us mention that just like CNN, Times of Israel conducted an interview with a “rebel” commander who made quite obvious their relationship with Israel.

There’s truth to the above, but that doesn’t mean the efforts have been genuine. It’s clear that Joulani has received the backing of powerful interests to, essentially, depose Assad and become new Emir of Syria, but one who is palatable and able to be repackaged to Western audiences. That means his image had to undergo a major rebranding, which is what’s happening now. The reports of his suddenly showing a softer side, courting Christians, Alawis, and the like (rumor of him appointing a Christian bishop as governor of Aleppo), particularly in newly-captured Aleppo, are true to an extent, but it’s obviously a ploy to win wider international support and present as a legitimate leadership figure, while sweeping his radical  past under the rug.

Interestingly, the CIA has shifted their tactics. Unlike the widespread brutality and systematic use of knives and slaughter that characterized their actions in previous years, these groups now leverage negotiations to achieve swift and strategic gains. Their focus is on controlling territory by facilitating the withdrawal of Syrian army forces without prolonged fighting, a pragmatic approach that enables them to expand their influence with minimal resistance. This shift has rapidly reshaped the map of control, raising pressing questions about the future of Syria and the Levant.

In short: one can see the traces of a very well-developed hybrid campaign that spans military, political, and ideological spheres. This has extended to being a critical component of Hama’s capture, wherein HTS reportedly made overtures to the Ismailis in Salamiyeh, a town at Hamas’ vital eastern flank, to put down their arms peacefully, allowing Hama’s encirclement: Now Salamiyeh has become a key enveloping vector toward Homs: or context: Salamiyah is the city of Nizari Ismail is, and their current Ismail leader is Prince Karim Aga khan, a Pakistani based in France. The Rothschild’s approached him to request his people in Salameyah to lay down weapons to avoid any bloodshed, and he accepted. Just as this town fell, most of the other cities, towns and villagers fell. This was done by bribes and threats – the old MICE (money, ideology, coercion and extortion) way. Qatar and the CIA funded this as well.

 The Aga Khan’s grandfather made his bed with the French Rothschild’s in the 19th Century. Since then, this fake leader has been waiting for a chance to become some kind of leader of the heretic sects of Islam. The French Rothschild’s are keeping him on ice. Their influence is used from time to time, in order to help the Rothschild’s attain dominance in the region.

The Khoja Muslim community was founded by the 14th century Ismaili Imam, Pir Sadruddin. Upon settling on the western coast near Sindh after a long journey from Yemen, he converted a number of Hindu traders to Ismailism and gave them the Persian title of ‘Khwaja’ meaning ‘Respected’, which got corrupted to ‘Khoja’ owning to the local Gujarati language. These people were the first converts to Ismailism in India

This is nothing new for the Rothschild’s. Not long after the 1979 Iranian Revolution which saw Shia Islam take power, M16 released a book called “the Mahdi”.

The Mahdi by A. J. Quinnell

He who controls the Mahdi will control the entire Arab world. — The greatest “miracle” in fourteen hundred years is about to take place…a miracle orchestrated by British Intelligence and the CIA, joined incredibly by the KGB. — One blinding eruption of flame–and three millions Arabs at Mecca will think they’re witnessing the arrival on earth of the Mahdi, the reincarnation of Muhammad, fourteen centuries after the prophet’s death. It is a plan of immense audacity and unthinkable consequences.

 The Mahdi is a fictional story about the battle between intelligence agencies to create a false messiah in order to control the Middle East. It was published in 1981! The date is significant as it was published just after the CIA installed Khomeini as Iran’s new ruler.

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Just days before the fall of Aleppo, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Syria against facilitating aid to Hezbollah – and it is no coincidence that this crisis began shortly after the ceasefire was finalized. Our next article is called “The Syrian Coup “.